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Abstract
Callisto, a non-profit that has created an online sexual assault reporting platform
for college campuses, has expanded its work to combat sexual assault and professional
sexual coercion in other industries. In our new product, users will be invited to an
online matching escrow that will detect repeat perpetrators and create pathways to
support for victims. Users of this product enter incident details and perpetrator iden-
tities into the escrow. This data can only be decrypted by a Legal Options Counselor
(a third-party lawyer vetted by Callisto) when at least one other user enters the iden-
tity of the same perpetrator. If perpetrator identities match, each user is assigned a
Legal Options Counselor, who will connect users to each other (if appropriate) and
help each user determine their best path towards justice. User relationships with Le-
gal Options Counselors are structured so that relevant communications benefit from
client-counselor privilege. A combination of client-side encryption, encrypted com-
munication channels, oblivious pseudo-random functions, key federation, and Shamir
Secret Sharing keep data encrypted so that only Legal Options Counselors gain access
to identifying user submitted data when a perpetrator match is identified. In this
paper, we present an informal risk management assessment, threat model, and cryp-
tographic solution overview for our new product. A later paper will provide a formal
security analysis and mathematical proofs of our cryptographic scheme.
1 The Problem of Sexual Assault and Harassment
An estimated 20% of women, 7% of men, and 24% of transgender and gender non-
conforming students are sexually assaulted during their college careers. Less than 10%
of survivors of such assault report those incidents to administrators, local police, campus
security, or other authorities. Those who choose to report do so an average of 11 months
after their assault, making it hard to conduct an effective investigation. Those investi-
gations are not challenging because perpetrators are unknown – in fact, 85% of college
survivors know their assailant – but rather because investigators are not sure whether to
believe that an assault actually took place. Only 6% of assaults reported to the police
end with the assailant spending a single day in prison, meaning that over 99% of those
perpetrators will not face serious consequences for their actions. Thus, there is at present
no effective deterrent to sexual assault in the United States [4, 3].
Two facts suggest a solution direction that motivates Callisto’s new capability. First, an
estimated 90% of college sexual assaults are committed by repeat perpetrators. These serial
perpetrators assault an average of 6 times before they graduate from college. Unfortunately,
with such a low reporting rate, it is fairly unlikely that even serial perpetrators will be
reported, much less reported more than once. As a result, investigators often have no
knowledge of a pattern of behavior of the accused when trying to make a fair judgment on
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a case. Without clear evidence (which is hard to gather if a report is made months after
an assault) or a pattern of behavior, authorities are often hesitant to assume liability for
taking action against an accused perpetrator. It is far more common for colleges to be
sued for expelling an accused sexual assailant than for neglecting the safety and privacy
rights of victims.
Second, in a survey conducted by Callisto of over 200 college sexual assault survivors,
a clear pattern emerged – for most victims, reporting an incident of sexual assault was not
worth it, unless they knew they were not the only victim of that assailant. Learning of
another victim of the same assailant dramatically increased victims’ willingness to report,
as well as their perceived likelihood of being believed if they reported. We might create
a sea change if victims could learn that they are “not the only one”. However, in our
current environment, the only way they can learn of other victims is through the “whisper
network”, or if their perpetrator is identified in the press or on social media.
As the #MeToo movement has manifested, it has become clear that sexual assault and
harassment, especially in the workplace, is prevalent across many industries. Incentives
have shifted so that employers and professional sectors are now facing the same kind of
pressure that colleges faced 4 years ago: pressure to take tangible action to address sexual
misconduct. However, employers face many of the same issues as college investigators:
delayed reports with little evidence other than the testimony of the victim, and with no
good way to learn whether the accused exhibited a pattern of behavior. Victims in the
workplace face the same stark reality as college survivors – that it is often not worth it to
report unless you know that you are not the only one. The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission’s 2016 report on workplace harassment found that almost one third of
the approximately 90,000 complaints received by the EEOC in fiscal year 2015 included an
allegation of workplace harassment [8]. Roughly three out of four employees who experi-
enced harassment never talked about it with a supervisor, manager or union representative.
Employees choose not to report or file a complaint because they fear disbelief, inaction by
management, blame, or social or professional retaliation. While everyone can agree that
the current equilibrium does not work, it remains in the best interest of both victims and
authorities to continue the culture of silence. If nothing changes, once the #MeToo move-
ment fades, victims will continue to not report, authorities will resume not taking action,
and serial perpetrators will continue to assault and harass more victims.
Unfortunately, under-reporting by victims and associated non-accountability of perpe-
trators is not the only problem to be solved. As much as we believe that efforts to stop
sexual assault and harassment would benefit from full disclosure and transparency, that
same ideal works against victims. A victim’s identity, details of incidents, and identities
of perpetrators are all highly sensitive information. In the wrong hands, that information
can be used to cause serious harm. Worse, it can be used to inhibit the reporting and
follow-up so necessary to helping victims find justice. Perpetrators would certainly use
the knowledge that they might be reported to intimidate, threaten, or take legal action
against victims. More importantly, society often uses such information to damage victim
or perpetrator reputations or wellbeing. Finally, and most importantly, each victim’s right
to choose their path to justice is paramount. Victims need a way to discover the paths
open to them and find support on those paths while retaining their privacy and personal
security.
2 Solution Overview
Callisto approaches the problem of hesitance in reporting assault by using the mathematical
tool of game theory : a way of modeling situations of conflict among parties [2]. In game
theory terms, there is a first-mover disadvantage with high consequences for a victim
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when accusing a perpetrator. That disadvantage comes from the disclosure and resulting
exposure of the victim, opening the victim up to consequences (countermoves in game
theory) of retaliation, disbelief by authorities, reputation damage, and stigma. Callisto’s
solution leverages the two key facts described in the previous section to eliminate first-
mover disadvantage: we enable the likely multiple victims of a perpetrator to know they
are not alone and create a path for them to act together. This approach disincentivizes
retaliatory countermoves by perpetrators while supporting combined action by victims that
reduces disbelief by authorities and likelihood of reputation damage.
Callisto approaches the problem of protecting victim (and perpetrator) privacy through
comprehensive use of privacy-preserving encryption technologies and user authentication
practices. Personal information of users, their accounts of incidents, and the identities of
perpetrators they provide are protected by encryption from before that data leaves the
user’s personal computer. All such data stays encrypted until decryption on the personal
workstation of a Callisto Legal Options Counselor. In addition, even Counselors cannot
see incident or perpetrator identity information unless more than one user has identified
the same perpetrator. Access to user accounts are protected by multi-factor authentication,
strong password requirements, and e-mail verification. User activity on the platform cannot
be linked to identifying user account information.
Callisto’s new offering is available to users by invitation only. Invited users will receive
an e-mail invitation to activate accounts on Callisto’s system. They will then verify their
e-mail address. Once verified, users may submit incident entries, modify them, or delete
them at will. Each entry includes the identity of the accused perpetrator, which may be
in one or more of several forms: an email address, a cell phone number, or a social media
URL. Upon submission, encrypted data is categorized in two sets: Assignment Data and
Entry Data. This is discussed in further detail in section 4.3. When matches are identified,
Assignment Data is triaged by the Director of Legal Options Counseling (DLOC), a Callisto
attorney, who manages the network of third-party Legal Options Counselors (LOCs). The
DLOC assigns each matched user their own LOC who will review Entry data and reach
out to that user individually to help them find their desired pathway to justice.
3 Legal Framework
3.1 Categorization of Data
Callisto’s platform and services are designed to provide maximum protection of Entry
Data, and to empower the victim with the choice of whether to share such information,
with whom, and when. Entry Data is comprised of the following:
Identifying Data
• Perpetrator name
• Perpetrator unique identifiers, including social media account information
• Victim preferred name
• Victim preferred phone number
• Victim preferred contact email
• Victim preferred contact method (phone, email, text, chat)
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Non-Identifying Data
• State of current residence of Matched User
• Categorization of sexual misconduct
• Industry of perpetrator
The non-identifying data is a subset of Entry Data that enables the assignment of a
Matched User to the best suited LOC without directly or indirectly identifying either
the user or perpetrator. It is also referred to as Assignment Data.
3.2 Legal Constraints
Callisto has designed the platform and services so that, to the extent possible, Entry Data
is “not discoverable,” meaning that it is protected from litigation or investigation discovery
requests (including subpoenas served to Callisto). Prior to data relating to victims and
perpetrators being shared with the Legal Options Counselors, processes are put in place to
ensure that all victims agree to sharing the data they submitted in their entry with their
assigned Legal Options Counselors. Information is generally not discoverable when (i) it
is encrypted and no-one has the ability to decrypt it, or (ii) someone has the ability to
decrypt it, but the information is otherwise protected by a privilege, such as the attorney-
client privilege protection. The platform is designed so that Callisto staff does not have
at any point in time (before and/or after a match) any access to any identifying Entry
Data. In order for identifying Entry Data to be protected from discovery via encryption,
no Callisto employee can have the capability to decrypt it. If Callisto receives a subpoena
for encrypted data, and a Callisto employee has access to the key to decrypt such data,
then Callisto will be obligated to (i) compel its employee to use the key and decrypt the
data and (ii) produce the decrypted data in response to the subpoena. Therefore, no
Callisto employee has access to any decryption key at any point in the process (including
after a match has occurred) that would permit access to identifying Entry Data. Callisto
designates a third party to receive the decryption key and use it under a certain set of
circumstances (e.g. Legal Options Counselor’s key can unlock Entry Data upon a match
of two victims with a single perpetrator). Although these Legal Options Counselors could
receive a subpoena for the encrypted data, the data is protected by a specific privilege, i.e.
a special legal protection of the confidentiality of the data that makes it not discoverable.
Since the Legal Options Counselor is a third party attorney, and the purpose of receiving
access to the Entry Data is to deliver legal advice to the victim, then the Entry Data will be
considered an attorney client communication and will be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Therefore, Callisto has required that any third party who has a decryption key
that can unlock Entry Data at any point in the process 1) is an attorney and 2) receives
the Entry Data as a communication from the victim the purpose of which is to seek legal
advice.
3.3 User Pin
Once a user creates an account, the user provides an account email (preferred email) as part
of their login credentials, as well as a 4-digit pin generated by the user. Callisto (1) hashes
the preferred email together with the 4-digit pin, and (2) public key encrypts the preferred
email with a key stored on the communication server. Public-key encryption with a key
stored on the communication server enables Callisto to send password reset emails as well
as general product update emails to account holders. Hashing the preferred email together
with the user generated 4-digit pin adds a degree of randomness which prevents linking a
user’s preferred email address to their unique account ID (such account ID is linked to all
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activities of the user on Callisto, including the creation of an entry and the entry’s match
to another user account ID and to a perpetrator ID). User activity on Callisto (creation
of an entry, matching with another victim, being assigned a Legal Options Counselor) is
therefore not tied to a user’s email address or any other identifying account information.
If Callisto receives a subpoena requesting activity information about a specific individual,
Callisto would not be able to provide any relevant information.
4 Callisto’s Privacy Risk Management Framework
Callisto takes the responsibility of protecting user privacy seriously. Threats to privacy of
information in a computer system come from a variety of adversaries: external adversaries
that may break into a system in a variety of ways, from brute force cyber exploits to
compromising user credentials; insider adversaries who may have authorized access to a
system and use those rights inappropriately; and imposter adversaries who pretend to be
genuine system users in order to see what can be learned.
Our early security stance assessment used a lightweight form of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology Risk Management Framework (NIST RMF) assessment [9]. In
addition, our design was reviewed in depth by a security assessment team, and all discovered
issues were addressed before platform release. In addition, we will continually self-test our
systems for security vulnerabilities after platform release, and continuously apply patches
and updates. Here, we summarize our initial NIST RMF assessment by providing an
overview of the information assets we aim to protect for users and perpetrators, and our
approaches for protecting those assets. We describe these assets roughly in the order they
appear in the user experience flow of our product.
4.1 Sensitive Information Assets Held by Callisto
Invited Users. Callisto provides access to the platform and counseling services (as ap-
plicable) through white-listing email accounts. Invited Users are members who are email-
invited to have access to Callisto. The information Callisto learns about Invited Users
includes:
• Invitation email address – email addresses are sensitive: they may include names,
and may be correlated with other external information held by a potential adversary;
• Organization name (as applicable) – organization names are sensitive: the relation-
ship between an invited user and an organization may not be public knowledge. In
addition, the customer relationship with Callisto may not be public knowledge.
Activated Users. An Activated User is an Invited User who visits the Callisto site and
registers an account. The information Callisto learns about Activated Users includes:
• Preferred email address – the hash of a preferred email address concatenated with a
user-submitted 4-digit pin;
• Access to Callisto is sensitive, so we protect user access in multiple ways: we protect
each Activated User’s passphrase and use additional authentication factors to verify
user access rights.
Escrowed Users. An Escrowed User is an Activated User who has submitted one or
more records of sexual assault or harassment. If an adversary discovers that a user is
escrowed, or exfiltrates those records, it can cause significant damage to the user and to
the perpetrator. This information includes Entry Data as described in Section 3.1.
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Assigned Users. An Assigned User is an Escrowed User who has a perpetrator match
with another user. Once such a match has been discovered, the Director of Legal Options
Counseling has access to Assignment Data as described in Section 3.1. Recall that Assign-
ment Data does not directly or indirectly identify the user or perpetrator, but is sufficient
to assign a Legal Options Counselor to the user.
Matched Users. A Matched User is a user who is assigned a Legal Options Counselor.
LOCs help survivors navigate their options, whether legal or not, weigh benefits and risks
of action, and explore whether they want to come forward, and in what manner. The
Legal Options Counselor has access to Entry Data. Users and LOCs engage in direct
conversations protected by attorney-client privilege.
Callisto Legal Options Counselor Credentials. The Director of Legal Options Coun-
seling and the network of Legal Options Counselors have sensitive access credentials that
are initially generated by Callisto.
We protect:
• Account passwords, even though a login alone does not allow access to sensitive user
or incident information described above;
• Secret access keys that the DLOC or LOCs use to access encrypted information about
users.
Callisto Information Technology Support Personnel. Callisto IT support person-
nel have no access to the encrypted information about users and incidents described above.
However, an adversary that compromises the credentials of any IT personnel may be able
to corrupt or destroy that information, and thus harm our users and our business. Access
to Callisto systems by IT personnel is secured in the same way as access by Users and
Counselors.
Callisto Data Analysts. Callisto uses statistics about incidents and progression through
the legal options counseling workflow in order to measure user impact. For this reason,
Data Analysts have access to options counseling workflow state statistics, but no access or
cryptographic keys to user information, perpetrator identities, or incident records. How-
ever, even this statistical information may be sensitive, so we secure access by our analysts
in the same multi-factor way that we use for users, Counselors, and IT personnel.
4.2 Technical approaches for securing sensitive information at Callisto
Table 1 below describes, for each asset type above, how we protect the asset type, as well
as who has access under what conditions.
5 Cryptographic Design
5.1 Roles in our Cryptographic Design
Data submission involves interaction between several parties: the user’s browser, the Cal-
listo application server, and the Callisto key server. Data is stored within a relational
database on the Callisto application server. The key server serves two roles: it stores a
predetermined key whose purpose is explained below, and it authenticates Callisto users
during the login process.
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Information Asset Type How Protected Decryptable by
Invitation e-mail address Public key cryptosystem Callisto
Preferred e-mail address Bcrypt hash of the SHA-
256 hash of the e-mail address
concatenated with the 4-digit
pin
N/A
User authentication Multi-factor authentication
service
N/A
User passphrase Randomly generated string
of 6 words
N/A
Assignment data see Crypto Design, below DLOC
(only after a match)
Entry data see Crypto Design, below LOC
(only after a match)
DLOC and LOCs Hardware authentication N/A
secret keys device
Table 1: Callisto Sensitive Information Assets
5.2 Cryptographic Components
Our system is designed to ensure that a compromise of one of the Callisto servers, the
application server or the key server, reveals no information about Assignment and Entry
Data. To achieve this goal the Callisto system uses the following cryptographic components:
• Shamir Secret Sharing [10]: Let s be a secret key. Shamir Secret Sharing is a tech-
nique that lets us split s into many shares s1, s2, . . . , sn so that (1) a single share si
reveals nothing about s, and (2) when two shares become public, anyone can recon-
struct the secret s. Briefly, to create shares of s we generate a random line in a plane
of possible secret shares whose y-intercept is the secret s. The shares of s are points
on this line. A single point reveals nothing about the line, but two points reveal the
line and thus enable computing its y-intercept.
• Oblivious pseudo-random functions (OPRFs). An OPRF uses a secret key ks to map
a value x to a pseudorandom value xˆ [7]. This secret key ks is stored on the Callisto
key server. A client who has an input x can interact with the Callisto key server to
obtain xˆ. The “oblivious” property refers to the fact that in this process, the key
server learns nothing about x, yet the client learns xˆ. We stress that this process is
deterministic: evaluating the OPRF at the point x (using the key ks) always results
in the same pseudorandom value xˆ.
• Symmetric encryption. For a given secret key k and message m we will use c ←
E(k,m) to denote the encryption of m using key k. We will use D(k, c) to denote the
decryption process. Callisto uses libsodium’s default implementation for symmetric
encryption [5].
• Public key encryption. We will use c← E(pk ,m) to denote the encryption ofm using
public key pk , and D(sk , c) to denote the decryption of c using the corresponding
secret key sk . Callisto uses libsodium for public key cryptography [5].
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5.3 The Data Submission and Protection Process
The Callisto key server is initialized to hold the OPRF secret key ks. The database server
holds no secrets. To simplify our description here, we describe a single Callisto Legal
Options Counselor. That LOC generates a key pair pk and sk for a public-key encryption
scheme and makes the public key pk available to the public.
With this setup complete, we informally describe the cryptographic portions of work-
flows for (1) entry submission, (2) entry encryption, (3) entry editing, (4) perpetrator
matching, and (5) revealing information to the DLOC and LOC in our system at a high
level. Full details, along with a cryptographic security model, will be available in a forth-
coming paper.
Submitting an Entry. The user’s computer (the client) collects the Entry Data from
the user and formats it into a serialized structure. As mentioned in the legal framework,
the Assignment Data is derived as a subset of the Entry Data and contains only the fields
necessary for a DLOC for assigning a user to a LOC.
Next, the user authenticates to the key server, and once authenticated, the user’s client
interacts with the oblivious pseudo-random function (OPRF) system on the key server to
transform the low-entropy perpetrator’s ID P into a pseudorandom value Pˆ with sufficient
entropy for use in our secret sharing approach. During this step, the key server learns the
authentication token, but learns nothing about P from the user’s client. Only the user’s
client learns Pˆ .
The client then creates a secret share. It uses Pˆ to derive three 32-byte pseudorandom
quantities (a, k, pi) using the key derivation function in libsodium. The first two quantities
define a line equation Y = aX + k whose y-intercept is k. The client evaluates this line
equation at the point X = U to obtain s = aU + k, where U is the hash of the user’s
unique id. The pair (U, s) is one share of a Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme for the secret k.
All arithmetic operations are performed modulo a prime number; Callisto uses the prime
p = 2256 + 297.
Encrypting an Entry. The client encrypts Entry Data using a fresh, random entry
data key ke to obtain an encrypted entry eEntry← E(ke, EntryData). It then encrypts ke
twice, once using the key k generated above from Pˆ , and once using a user key kU which
is discussed further below:
ce ← E(k, ke), cU ← E(kU , ke).
All these symmetric encryptions are done using authenticated encryption with associated
data (AEAD) where pi and a pre-defined string are used as the associated data. The
client then performs one more encryption, encrypting (U, s, ce) under the Legal Options
Counselor’s public key pkLOC to obtain a doubly-encrypted ciphertext:
c← E(pk , (U, s, ce)).
A new key, ka, is randomly generated and used to encrypt Assignment Data, creating
the following: eAssign ← E(ka, AssignmentData). Using the same k, we obtain ca ←
E(k, ka). Once again, the symmetric encryptions are done using authenticated encryption
with associated data (AEAD) where pi and pre-defined strings (different as above) are used
as the associated data. The public key of the DOC is used to encrypt
cassign ← E
(
pkDLOC , (U, s, ca)
)
.
The client authenticates to the Callisto database server and sends it the tuple
(pi, c, cassign, cU , eEntry, eAssign). (1)
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The database server stores this tuple and sends an acknowledgement to the user’s browser.
On its own, this tuple (1) reveals nothing about the Entry Data. Not even the Legal
Options Counselor can decrypt eEntry, since it is not possible for them to construct the
encryption key k using c and ca, respectively, for the DLOC and LOC. Moreover, if a user
submits two records about the same P , this second record will result in the same share
(U, s) as the first record, and thus nothing new is revealed about P . Finally, nothing
about the submission process reveals anything to the user’s browser about other entries or
perpetrator identities.
Editing an Entry. The user key kU makes it possible for the user to update the record
after the initial submission, if needed. The key kU is generated on the user’s client at initial
submission time and the user is asked to write down this key as a string of random words.
When the user needs to update the submission, the user types in this key and the user’s
client uses it to update the encrypted entry eEntry by first retrieving ke ← D(kU , cU ) to
produce eEntry′ ← E(ke, EntryData′).
If the perpetrator identity, P , is updated with P ′, this new value is used to perform an
OPRF with the key server, creating Pˆ ′ and thus pi′, k′, U ′, and s′. This produces:
c′e ← E(k′, ke) c′ ← E(pk, (U ′, s′, c′e))
If AssignmentData has been updated, a new random key, k′a, is generated and used to
produce eAssign′. If P was updated,
c′a ← E(k′, k′a) c′assign ← E(pkDLOC , (U ′, s′, c′a))
Otherwise,
c′a ← E(k, k′a) c′assign ← E(pkDLOC , (U, s, c′a))
For each item in (1) that has been updated, the original is replaced. For example,
when both the perpetrator identity and some field in AssignmentData has been updated,
the following tuple is stored in the database.
(pi′, c′, c′assign, cU , eEntry
′, eAssign′). (2)
Matching Entries. The Callisto database server periodically performs an offline match
search. If it finds two entries with the same pi component, it identifies these records as a
match, because they share a common perpetrator. It then notifies the DLOC about the
match. Then, the DLOC assigns each matched user to their own LOC via the Callisto
platform.
Note that matching is done without the database server having access to perpetra-
tor identities or entries in unencrypted form. Thus no adversary capable of penetrating
the database server can learn anything about perpetrator identities or incidents from the
matching process.
Decrypting Entries. When the database server identifies a match, the DLOC and LOC
can then obtain the (U, s) values for all matched entries using their respective keys, skDLOC
and sk:
(U, s, ca)← D(skDLOC , cassign) (U, s, ce)← D(sk, c)
.
Once at least two shares are decrypted, they can be used to derive the slope, a and the
original k. Using this k, the DLOC and LOC can decrypt the following, respectively.
ke ← D(k, ce) ka ← D(k, ca)
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For each ce and ca that can be decrypted with a valid k, the resulting ke or ka values
can be used to then decrypt eEntry and eAssign. The decryption algorithm is described
in more detail in the next section.
6 Additional Details
This paper is too brief for an exhaustive description of our cryptographic approach to
protecting incidents, perpetrators, and connections to the Escrowed Users reporting them.
However, we include here some additional details that may be of interest to readers.
Identifying Perpetrators. Escrowed Users may identify Perpetrators using one or more
diverse credentials such as social media URLs, phone numbers, or email addresses. In our
system, we insist on the use of such (relatively) unambiguous identifiers. To allow for
this diversity of credentials, pi and s are not scalars. Instead, they are vectors of values ~pi
and ~s, where each component in these vectors corresponds to a particular predetermined
type of identifying credential. We say that two records (~pi1, . . .) and (~pi2, . . .) are a match
if the vectors ~pi1 and ~pi2 match on at least one component. Moreover, the Callisto Legal
Options Counselor workstation can fill in additional components in the ~pi and ~s vectors for
an incident once such a match is determined, because they have access to the necessary
resources. Thus Callisto propagates perpetrator identities, using the human judgment of
our Counselor, to achieve more complete identity credential vectors for perpetrators.
Privacy Roots of Trust in Callisto. Every system has one or more roots of trust : one
or more components that are assumed secure in certain ways. Briefly, our system assumes
the following privacy protecting roots of trust:
• The user’s browser (and computer) are one root of trust in that we assume no ad-
versary has compromised that component with the intent of observing interactions
with our system. In other words, protecting against system adversaries with vantage
point on the user’s computer is out of scope for our system. Users are responsible for
adequately protecting the passphrase they use to log in, as well as the devices and
accounts they use for multi-factor authentication.
• Above, we described a system using a single key server. The OPRF key is a highly
sensitive secret in our system. If this key is exposed to an adversary, then that
adversary can unmask records in the database by performing an exhaustive search
over potential perpetrator identities. In addition, if this key is lost, then matching
post-loss perpetrator identities to pre-loss identities is impossible. To further protect
the OPRF key, our system uses two servers, each of which keep a single crypto-
graphic share of the key, but not the whole key. Thus key theft requires compromise
of two distinct servers with different administrators, and possibly running different
operating systems. This split server is another root of trust of our system. One of
these servers is a dedicated, highly protected physical server. The other will be a
virtualized server that is hosted on a separate cloud provider. To prevent loss of the
OPRF key, both servers are backed up in an encrypted backing store. To further
thwart dictionary attacks, the key servers will perform rate limiting.
• The Legal Options Counselor’s workstation contains a password vault used to hold
the Counselor’s secret key that enables decryption of user profiles, as well as incident
records and perpetrator identities (these latter two only after a match, as described
above). This vault is in turn protected by a passphrase known only to the Coun-
selor. Such passphrases are a partial root of trust for our system. We may increase
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security in this area by storing cryptographic shares of the Counselor’s private key in
a distributed fashion, and performing decryptions without bringing those key shares
together in the clear, ever.
• The database server is not a privacy root of trust for our system, because it holds no
secret keys, and because all sensitive information held there is encrypted with keys
held on other components in our system.
Managing Multiple Legal Options Counselor Keys. Above we describe a single
Legal Options Counselor but in reality there may be multiple counselors who need to
access the same information. Each Legal Options Counselor has a distinct public and
private key pair. For each Legal Options Counselor, there will be a copy of c′ encrypted
under that public key. To add a new LOC, Bob, a first LOC, Alice, would need to decrypt
an encrypted share and re-encrypt as follows.
cAlice ← E
(
pkAlice, (U, s, c
′)
)
(U, s, c′)← D(skAlice, c′Alice)
Once this share is decrypted, Bob can now encrypt its contents with his public key.
cBob ← E
(
pkBob, (U, s, c
′)
)
Bob now has access to the shares and can decrypt all matched data. In order to remove
Bob from the system, each ciphertext cBob encrypted under his key is removed from the
database.
Decryption Algorithm. Since the code for generating the (U, s) values occurs on the
client side, a malicious adversary could alter the (U, s) values of their share, producing
combinations that cannot be used to derive a valid key, k. To mitigate this threat, the
decryption algorithm is provided a vector of matched shares containing (U, s) values as
well as ciphertexts to be decrypted. The algorithm first tries to interpolate the first two
(U, s) values. If a valid key, k, is found, it is used to decrypt as many remaining ce or ca
values as possible. Otherwise, it tries to interpolate and find a valid k with all remaining
shares. If no valid key is found, an error message is produced for the current share and
the algorithm moves onto repeat this process for the next share. This process is described
below.
Algorithm 1 Interpolation and Decryption Algorithm
procedure Decrypt(shares)
while shares.length > 0 do
flag ← false
s← shares.pop()
for each t in s do
k ← interpolateShares(s, t)
if symmetricDecrypt(k, s) then
flag ← true
for each u in s do




unableToDecrypt(s) . Creates an error message corresponding to the id of s
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The symmetricDecrypt function mentioned decrypts either ce or ca using k. It then
uses the resulting key to decrypt either eEntry or eAssign.
7 Demo Application
A demo application is made available to convey our methods for client-side encryption and
Shamir Secret Sharing in a user-friendly format. It can be found at
https://cryptography.projectcallisto.org.
Unlike the Callisto application, the demo is set up as a single server with the browser sim-
ulating interactions between the client and the various servers. The demo application does
not reflect the full cryptographic functionality of the product. The table below indicates
specific functionalities where the encryption strategies are different in the demo application
versus the full product.
Functionality Full Product Demo
PerpID inputs Vector of IDs Single ID
PerpID randomization OPRFks with key servers SHA512(PerpID‖kdemo)
Symmetric Encryption AEAD AE
Data storage Callisto database Browser
Matching Across vectors Equality between IDs
Table 2: Implementation Differences
kdemo is a pre-selected string with no correlation to ks
8 Subsequent Work
In the time since release of our original white paper describing the new Callisto platform,
two relevant subsequent works have appeared in the literature. Each of these bears some
resemblance to our platform. In this section we briefly comment on both of these works,
comparing and contrasting with Callisto where applicable.
SATE [1]. In October 2018, Arun et al. proposed SATE, a cryptographic solution for
an allegation escrow system. Their system uses dynamic multi-party computation and
verifiable pseudo-random functions to assure security of sensitive information. In contrast,
our platform splits trust among two independently managed and located key servers, each of
which hold cryptographic shares of the master secret key we use. In addition, our database
computation servers hold no key material or decrypted data – only client browsers of LOCs
can decrypt Entry Data, and only client browsers of DLOCs can decrypt Assignment Data.
SATE relies on a collective of external parties that together compute required ran-
domness in a verifiable way and together securely perform matching and decryption. If
the majority of these parties act honestly, confidentiality and functionality are preserved.
Unfortunately, human trust does not extend easily to the kind of collectives upon which
SATE relies. One reason is that in such a distributed model, accountability is difficult to
reason about or assign, while in general humans tend to conflate trust with accountability.
Another reason is that forming such collectives is tricky in practice because of the nuanced
difference between incentivizing participation and gaining undue influence over that par-
ticipation (and thus raising questions about security). In contrast, the Callisto choice of
a single organization is intentional: users need extend trust to no-one initially, and then
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only to legal representatives (LOCs) contracted by a single organization (Callisto) that
is independent of any entity where incidents might occur. Risk of coercion of Callisto is
minimal: because of its funding model and non-profit status, Callisto owes allegiance to
no-one that might be a reported perpetrator.
SATE requires user pre-registration with a trusted authority in order to link real-world
identities to user accounts (and to user cryptographic keys). While authenticating users
in this way is an interesting potential mitigation against malicious users, we felt it to
be unreasonable in our application domain for two reasons. First, pre-registration allows
the trusted authority to know the identity of users registering, and thus to know who is
likely using the SATE service. Possesssion of this knowledge turns the trusted authority
into a security threat. Second, pre-registration requires interaction by each user with a
third party, which complicates the user experience in ways we felt unnecessary. In contrast,
Callisto aims to keep the user experience as simple as possible. We address the challenge of
identifying potential malicious users with a combination of controlled access by invitation
only, and by human judgment when reviewing matched records.
SATE allows survivors to choose the threshold of matches required for their data to
become accessible to the lawyer – a nice feature that offers flexibility to users. In contrast,
we selected a fixed threshold of 2 for Callisto, though our solution can be trivially extended
to support any value n ≥ 2 using n-way secret sharing instead of 2-way secret sharing. Our
choice was based on usability considerations, especially in light of the emotional distress
we recognize users may feel when reporting incidents: asking a user to choose how many
matches are required seems somewhat unreasonable without some well-understood criteria
by which to choose that value.
SATE is proven secure in the UC model - nicely done! Our security proof will appear
in a future paper.
EConfidante [6] puts forward the idea that access to sensitive data can be effectively
managed by employing a cluster of Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enclaves that
share a secret decryption key unknown outside enclave security boundaries. This system
also uses a blockchain approach to permanently store such sensitive data. Unfortunately,
EConfidante’s design raises several concerns, a few of which we list here. For example,
decisions about when to report incidents to authorities appear to be fully robotic, lacking
any concept of human intelligent decisions and sensitive reasoning about each victim’s
desired pathway to justice. Similarly, there appears to be no provision for human judgment
in deciding whether claims might be false or spurious. As another example, the choice of
a blockchain as a shared database prevents records from being deleted, ignoring the user’s
“right to be forgotten”, or to have an incident report deleted entirely. Another seemingly
important issue is that if the EConfidante enclave codebase changes (and of course it will
– all software has defects that must be repaired), then the entire system must be brought
down and started up again. Because the leader self-generates a new key with which all data
is encrypted, it appears (if our understanding is correct) that forward secrecy becomes a
problem in this situation: scanners cannot scan ledger entries written with different versions
of the running enclave code, so past reports become unusable for matching.
9 Conclusion and Next Steps
Callisto envisions a world where sexual assault and harassment are rare and survivors are
supported in their pursuit of justice. The reporting experience should be empowering for
survivors and should rebuild their sense of agency. Authorities should have the data they
need to prevent assault and stop serial perpetrators.
A thoughtful cryptographic design is essential in achieving this mission. In order to
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create a safe space for survivors of sexual assault to come forward with their most vulnerable
secret, it requires organizations like Callisto to build a technical solution that earns their
trust.
As we expand to serve and empower more users, we realize that our threat models will
become more sophisticated and complex. Therefore, as we expand from college campuses
into industry, our solution has evolved to protect against those risks.
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